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subject to a different standard of review 
than classifications prescribed by state 
and local governments. [d. Thus, apply-
ing the mid-level standard of scrutiny 
proposed by Fullilove, the Court held 
the FCC minority ownership policies 
constitutional. [d. at 3008-09. 
In upholding the FCC's minority pol-
icy, the Court held that promoting mi-
nority ownership of broadcasting sta-
tions served an important governmental 
objective. [d. The Court agreed with the 
congressional and FCC findings that mi-
nority preference policies promoted di-
versity in programming. [d. The role of 
the government, the Court reasoned, 
is to promote the dissemination of 
diverse information. [d. at 3010. The 
Court determined that the process of 
disseminating diverse information, 
through programming, was essential to 
the public welfare, and thus an impor-
tant governmental objective. 
After finding FCC preference policies 
served an important governmental objec-
tive, the Court determined that the 
FCC's policies were substantially related 
to the achievement of the government's 
interest. [d. In reviewing the nexus 
between minority ownership and pro-
gramming diversity, the Court deferred 
to the fact-finding abilities of Congress 
and the FCC's expertise and noted that 
Congress made clear its view that mi-
nority ownership policies advanced the 
goal of diverse programming. The Court 
further noted Congress' continuallyex-
pressed support of diversity in program-
ming through minority ownership. [d. at 
3012-13. 
The Court found race-based classifi-
cation may be. permissible in some in-
stances. In supporting permissible 
benign discrimination, the Court anal-
ogized diversity in programming and the 
fair cross-section requirement of the 
sixth amendment, which forbids ex-
cluding groups from a jury venire on the 
basis of race or sex. In addition, the 
Court compared Metro Broadcasting 
with voting rights cases that permit 
benign discrimination to involve minor-
ities in the political process. [d. at 3019. 
Similarly, the Court reasoned, benign 
discrimination is permiSSible to promote 
programming diversity. [d. 
Next, the Court rejected Shurberg's 
final contention that the minority dis-
tress policy operated to exclude nonmi-
norities from consideration in the trans-
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fer of certain stations, and thus unduly 
burdens nonminorities. [d. at 3025. As 
the majority noted, the policy could only 
be invoked at the Commission's discre-
tion and distress sales only involved a 
small number of broadcast licenses. Fur-
thermore, the power to invoke the dis-
tress sale was in the hands of the non-
minority station owner who may choose 
to seek renewal by attending an FCC 
hearing, rather than sell his license to a 
minority group. This, the Court found, 
decreased the chance that nonminori-
ties would suffer an undue burden. [d. at 
3027. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice O'Con-
nor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, contended 
that the constitution's guarantee of 
equal protection bound the federal and 
state governments equally, and that no 
lower level of scrutiny should be applied 
for federal action. [d. at 3030 (O'Con-
nor, )., dissenting). Justice O'Connor 
opined that the guarantee of equal pro-
tection extended to each citizen, re-
gardless of race. [d. at 3032 (O'Connor, 
)., dissenting). Neither the federal 
government nor the states may deny any 
person equal protection of the laws and 
governmental distinctions, she contended, 
among citizens based on race or ethni-
city would exact costs and carry sub-
stantial dangers. [d. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor believed the 
FCC policies should have been evalu-
ated under strict scrutiny and that under 
such analysis, the FCC policies would 
fail. [d. at 3044. 
Metro Broadcasting is Significant as it 
illustrates the Supreme Court's imple-
mentation of an intermediate level of 
review for federal race-conscious affir-
mative action policies. While state pro-
grams continue to receive a strict scru-
tiny standard of review, federal affirmative 
action programs with the approval of 
Congress, need only survive the mid-. 
level test for constitutionality. Metro 
Broadcasting also signifies that Fulli-
love remains good law. 
- Daryl D.Jones 
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz: 
STATE'S USE OF SOBRIETY 
CHECKPOINTS DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
In Michigan Department of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
state highway sobriety checkpoints do 
not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. The Court ruled that the state's 
interest in preventing drunk driving 
outweighed any intrusion upon drivers. 
The Michigan Department of State 
Police established a sobriety checkpoint 
program in 1986. Under specific gUide-
lines, sobriety checkpoints would be set 
up at selected sites along state roads. 
Vehicles passing through the check-
points would be stopped, and their driv-
ers would be briefly examined for signs 
of intoxication. Drivers displaying signs 
of alcohol impairment would be directed 
to a location out of the traffic flow 
where an officer would check the driv-
er's license and car registration and, if 
warranted, conduct further sobriety 
tests. An arrest would be made if the test 
results and observations by the police 
suggested that the driver was intoxi-
cated. [d. at 2484. At the only check-
point operated under the program, two 
of the drivers stopped were arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
[d. 
Respondents, the day before the op-
eration of the first checkpOint, filed a 
complaint seeking relief from potential 
subjection to the checkpOints. The trial 
court applied the balancing test set forth 
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), 
to decide the program's constitutional-
ity. This three prong test involved 
"balancing the state's interest in pre-
venting accidents caused by drunk driv-
ers, the effectiveness of sobriety check-
points in achieving that goal, and the 
level of intrusion on an individual's pri-
vacy caused by the checkpoints." Sitz, 
110 s. Ct. at 2484 (citing Brown, 433 
u.s. at 50-51). After applying the test, 
the trial court determined that the pro-
gram violated the fourth amendment. [d. 
Affirming the decision, the Michigan . 
Court of Appeals stated that the trial 
court was correct in its findings that the 
state had "a 'grave and legitimate' inter-
est in curbing drunken driving; [but] 
that sobriety checkpoint programs are 
generally 'ineffective' and, therefore, do 
. not significantly further that interest; 
and that the checkpoints' 'subjective 
intrusion' on individual liberties is sub-
stantial." Id at 2484-85. 
At the Supreme Court, respondents 
argued that a probable cause or reason-
able suspicion analysis was required, 
rather than the Brown balancing test. Id 
at 2485. Relying on Treasury Employees 
v. Von Raab, 489 u.S. 656 ( 1989), they 
contended that there must be a showing 
of some special governmental need be-
yond the normal need for criminal law 
enforcement before a balancing analysis 
is appropriate. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485. 
Respondents argued that because peti-
tioners demonstrated no special need, 
sobriety checkpoints warranted some 
level of individualized suspicion. Id. 
The Court, however, disagreed, stat-
ing that VonRaab did not repudiate any 
prior cases dealing with police stops of 
drivers on public highways. Id. The 
Court ruled that the relevant authorities 
were Brown and U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543 ( 1976), which also utilized 
a balancing analysis in approving high-
way checkpoints for detecting illegal 
aliens. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485. The Court 
then reiterated its holding that a fourth 
amendment "seizure" occurred when a 
vehicle was stopped at a checkpoint, 
and thus, the central issue was whether 
such seizures were "reasonable." Id. 
Applying the first prong of the Brown 
balancing test, the Court emphasized 
the magnitude of the drunken driving 
problem and the states' interest in erad-
icating it. Id. The Court cited the statis-
tical evidence, which showed that drunk 
drivers "cause an annual death toll of 
over 25,000, nearly one million personal 
injuries, and over five billion dollars in 
property damage." Id. at 2485-86 (quot-
ing 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
§ 1O.8(d) (2d ed. 1987)). 
The Court then examined the second 
prong of the Brown balancing test, that 
of "the measure of the intrusion on 
motorists stopped briefly at sobriety 
checkpoints." Id. at 2486. Comparing 
this intrusion to the one upheld in 
Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found "vir-
tually no difference between the levels 
of intrusion on law-abiding motorists 
from the brief stops necessary to the 
effectuation of these two types of check-
points .... " Id. Thus, the Court agreed 
with the Michigan Court of Appeals' 
finding that the "objective" intrusion, 
measured by the duration of the seizure 
and the intensity of the investigation, 
was rninirnal. Id. 
The Court, however, disagreed with 
that court's conclusion that the "subjec-
tive intrusion" on drivers, because of the 
potential for generating fear and sur-
prise, was substantial and unreasonable. 
Id. Comparing checkpoint stops to rov-
ing patrol stops, the Court found that 
the subjective intrusion of checkpoint 
stops was considerably less, reasoning 
that they were selected pursuant to spe-
cific guidelines with uniformed police 
officers stopping every approaching ve· 
hicle. Id. at 2486-87. The intrusion 
resulting from the brief stop at the sobri-
ety checkpoint, the Court stated, was 
"for constitutional purposes indistin· 
guishable from the checkpoint stops ... 
upheld in Martinez-Fuerte." Id. at 2487. 
Consequently, the Court held that the 
"subjective intrusion" on motorists was 
not unreasonable. Id. 
Lastly, the Court considered the "ef-
fectiveness" prong of the Brown balanc-
ing test, measuring the" degree to which 
the seizure advances the public interest." 
Id. ( quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 ). The 
Michigan Court of Appeals, relying on 
Martinez-Fuerte and Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979), found that the 
program failed this part of the test. Sitz, 
110 S. Ct. at 2487. In Prouse, the Court 
struck down a system of random stops 
made by Delaware Highway Patrol offic-
ers in an effort to apprehend unlicensed 
drivers and unsafe vehicles. In that case, 
the Court found no empirical evidence 
which would indicate that such stops 
were an effective means of accomplish-
ing that purpose and promoting road-
way safety. Id. 
In this case, however, the Court found 
that the empirical data supported a find-
ing that the program was effective in 
advancing the state's interest in prevent-
ing drunken driving. Id. The Court 
looked particularly close at the statistics 
in the record, which showed that approx-
imately 1.5 percent of the drivers pass-
ing through the checkpoint were ar-
rested for alcohol impairment, and that 
sobriety checkpoints utilized by other 
states resulted in arrests of approxi-
mately 1 percent of all drivers stopped. 
Id. at 2487 -88. As the ratio found consti-
tutional in Martinez-Fuertewas only 0.5 
percent, the Court found no justification 
for a different conclusion in this case. Id. 
at 2488. 
justice Brennan, in dissent, disagreed 
with the majority's holding that "no 
level of suspicion [was] necessary before 
the police may stop a car for the purpose 
of preventing drunken driving." Id. at 
2489 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stated 
that even though a majority of society 
would probably be willing to suffer the 
minimal intrusion of a sobriety check-
point, the government should still be 
required to prove that it had a reasona-
ble suspicion for such a seizure. Id. at 
2490. 
justice Stevens, in dissent, believed 
that the Court misapplied the balancing 
test of Brown by undervaluing the cit-
izen's freedom from random, unan-
nounced, investigatory seizures. Id. at 
2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He con-
cluded that the majority mist*enly as-
sumed that there was "virtually no dif-
ference" between a routine stop at a 
fixed checkpoint and a surprise stop at a 
sobriety checkpoint. Id. justice Stevens 
was also of the opinion that sobriety 
checkpoints were more intrusive and 
generated more fear and surprise than 
fixed checkpoints. Id. at 2493-94. Lastly, 
he noted that the majority's analysis of 
the "effectiveness" prong did not repre-
sent an increase over the number of 
arrests which would have been made 
using conventional patrols. Id. at 2495. 
This decision is significant because of 
the potential effect on other states. The 
Supreme Court held that the intrusion 
of sobriety checkpoints upon individual 
liberties was rninirnal. Therefore, a state's 
use of such checkpoints to prevent 
drunken driving may be employed if the 
checkpoints show some degree of effec-
tiveness. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled 
that sobriety checkpoints were consid-
ered a reasonable seizure as required by 
the fourth amendment. 
- Steven B. Vinick 
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
___________________________________ 21.1/The Law Forum-31 
